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I was awarded a Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) grant-in-aid for my researcher 
dissertation. Despite the popular narrative that African Americans have voted solidly Democratic 
since the rise of the New Deal, I argue that the Republican Party remained a viable option for 
African American voters through the 1960s. Moreover, even after the Goldwater debacle of 
1964, where over ninety percent of the African American vote went to Lyndon Johnson, many 
black Republicans became even more vocal in trying to reshape the image of their party. Rather 
than being statistical anomalies or naive supporters of a mythologized “Party of Lincoln” that 
does not warrant significant historical inquiry, African American Republicans throughout the 
1950s and 1960s were pragmatists, and despite their partisan affiliation, were by-and-large 
within the mainstream of African American political thought. 
While there is an abundance of contemporary scholarship surrounding African American 
voters, the civil rights movement, and politics during the 1950s through the 1970s, there is a 
remarkable absence of this vocal and active constituency. My dissertation seeks to fill this 
historiographic void. Since Nancy Weiss’s seminal Farewell to the Party of Lincoln was first 
published in 1983, and with a concurrent historiographic shift in the 1980s, away from politics 
and towards the social and cultural ramifications of the civil rights movement, there has been an 
underlying assumption on the part of many historians that African Americans have been solidly 
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Democratic since 1936. African American Republicans have been dismissed as an aberration, a 
statistical anomaly, or worse – traitors to their race and the civil rights movement. 
Similarly, it is equally difficult to find the African American voice in the recent 
scholarship of the Republican “Southern Strategy.” Within the past decade historians such as 
Matthew Lassiter and Lisa McGirr have challenged traditional interpretations of the Southern 
Strategy that emphasize its roots in racially coded language.
1
 While these works serve as a 
needed corrective of a strictly race-based interpretation of the rise of the modern right, they go to 
the other extreme of minimizing the role of race, and ignore it as an important category of 
analysis. Rhetorically, the language of Goldwater in 1964 and Nixon in 1968 implicitly 
demonstrated solidarity with white, racially motivated Southerners. Lassiter convincingly 
demonstrates that white “moderates” of the Sunbelt South, who purposefully distanced 
themselves from the more rabid racists of the Deep South, served as the core constituency of the 
new Republican Party of the late 1960s. What Lassiter leaves out, and what is left out of much of 
the historiography of the Southern Strategy, is how African American Republicans responded to 
the message of fiscal conservatism, “law and order,” and the ideology of neo-conservatism. 
 I contend that African American Republicans were joint members and participants of the 
civil rights movement. While their methods may have differed from the direct action protests of 
Martin Luther King, and their rhetoric was more conservative than young radical dissenters, their 
ultimate objectives paralleled that of the civil rights movement. Working within the apparatus of 
the Republican Party, these men and women believed that a two-party system, where both parties 
were forced to compete for the African American vote, was the best way to obtain stronger civil 
rights legislation. Moreover, while this group was often pushed to the sidelines, their continuous 
and vocal inner-party dissent helped moderate the message and platforms of the Republican 
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Party in the 1950s and 1960s. They also formed a major constituency of progressive Republicans 
like George Romney, William Scranton, John Sherman Cooper, and Nelson A. Rockefeller 
(NAR). 
Prior to conducting research at the RAC, I spent the previous two years at the  
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, and Gerald R. Ford Presidential 
libraries, the Library of Congress Manuscript Division, and over a dozen university archives 
across the country. The collections of African Americans like Clarence L. Townes Jr., who 
served as the director of the Republican National Committee’s Minority’s Division during the 
late 1960s, reveal a deep admiration and support for NAR. From his emergence on the national 
political spotlight in the 1960 presidential election, through the rest of the decade, Rockefeller 
was consistently the example pointed to by black Republicans as the type of leader their party 
needed. Sharply rejecting the conservatism espoused by Barry Goldwater and the growing right-
wing of the Republican Party, black Republicans were among the most vocal intra-party 
supporters of the progressive wing of the Grand Old Party. 
The George Hinman Files in NAR’s personal papers contain many documents relating to 
African Americans that I have not seen at any other archival repository. Of particular value to 
my research was a large folder relating to Grant Reynolds, an influential black Republican 
activist from White Plains, New York. Throughout the early 1960s, Reynolds was on the front 
lines of progressive Republicans rallying against the encroaching conservatism of  
Barry Goldwater and the far-right. He was joined by his close friend, Jackie Robinson, who 
frequently warned of “the danger of the Republican Party being taken over by the ‘lily-white-ist’ 
conservatives.”2 To black Republicans like Reynolds and Robinson, NAR was the ideal 
candidate to stop the sudden surge of conservative Republicanism during the early 1960s.  
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Throughout the early Kennedy years, Rockefeller was one of the most vocal critics of the 
administration’s initially slow handling of civil rights. An internal report written by 
Rockefeller’s staff – who were more than aware of his desire to run for the presidency in 1964 – 
argued emphatically that “The Kennedy Administration should be criticized for its lack of 
initiative in the field of integration … Such an important goal as integration should not be 
sacrificed to the desire for victory in other fields.”3 After Martin Luther King, Jr.’s arrest in 
Albany, Georgia, NAR publicly pleaded with Attorney General Robert Kennedy to intervene on 
King’s behalf and for the Justice Department to “take every precaution to assure the personal 
safety of Dr. King and his associates.”4 Using Jackie Robinson as his conduit, Rockefeller also 
donated tens of thousands of dollars to black churches that were burned by white supremacists in 
the summer of 1962.
5
 He also was one of the largest single contributors to King’s Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference throughout the 1960s. In 1963, as it became obvious that 
Republican voters had a clear choice between two polarized visions of the party represented by 
Goldwater and NAR in the forthcoming presidential primaries, Rockefeller’s campaign 
consistently emphasized their candidate’s superior record on civil rights. Press aide  
Harry O’Donnell wrote in a private memo that “the die obviously is cast for NR to go 
aggressively all-out on the civil rights issue--and, probably, rightly so consistent with his strong 
personal feelings on the matter as well as his position and record in the past.”6 Throughout the 
spring campaign of 1964, NAR was adamant in his opposition to anti-union “right to work 
laws,” and fully supported a national ban on discrimination in public accommodations, 
employment, and the sale/rental of private housing.
7
 His campaign literature often featured 
pictures of him shaking hands with Martin Luther King, Jr., and touted the candidate as an 
“uncompromising fighter for racial equality and human rights.”8 
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Despite his convictions, NAR failed to create momentum that could rival Goldwater’s 
grassroots movement that united previously unaffiliated and non-partisan right-wing factions. 
During the 1964 Republican National Convention, NAR was relegated to a 3:00 a.m. televised 
speech, and was booed off the stage by rowdy Goldwater conservatives. Black delegates faced 
similar treatment. Many recall being referred to as “niggers” by other attendants, and one 
delegate from Pennsylvania had his coat set on fire after a Goldwater supporter placed a lit cigar 
in its pocket.  
Immediately following the Republican National Convention, the handful of black 
delegates in attendance joined former baseball star and future NAR aide, Jackie Robinson in 
forming the National Negro Republican Assembly (NNRA) to protest the nomination of Barry 
Goldwater. While the Republican National Committee distanced itself from the NNRA, NAR  
was one of the few national Republican politicians to openly embrace the committee. Following 
Goldwater’s defeat, NAR wrote Grant Reynolds, who eventually would serve as the 
organization’s national president, and who currently headed its New York state branch. He noted 
that he was “delighted with what you are doing in the National Negro Republican Assembly to 
re-enlist Negro interest and participation in the Republican Party.” He continued arguing that he 
agreed with the black delegates that “the most discouraging part of the recent election campaign 
was the submergence of the great tradition and record of our Party in the matter of Negro 
equality,” and that “I can think of nothing more significant and important than what the National 
Negro Republican Assembly is now doing.”9  
Throughout 1965, Grant Reynolds continually prodded his party to advocate civil rights 
and reject the expansion of the far-right. At a meeting of Young Republicans at Oberlin College, 
Reynolds argued that many in his party were “pregnant with self-righteousness and self-
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delusion” for embracing Goldwater’s brand of conservatism. He warned the audience that they 
must “vanquish” this group of “so-called Republicans” and “right-wing-scum,” and instead 
embrace its heritage as the party of Lincoln.
10
 Like other members of the NNRA, Reynolds 
believed that only NAR had the status to reinvigorate the increasingly conservative Republican 
Party. In a private letter, Reynolds told NAR that he must “assume a major role in healing our 
Party’s wounds and restoring it to its former position of confidence and respect,” and that the 
restoration must begin with “recapturing the support of Negro voters for our Party.” Though it 
was a risky political move, Reynolds assured the governor that “Negro Republicans throughout 
the country … will serve to offer you and your colleagues our fullest support.”11 
Rockefeller’s staff recognized the importance of maintaining the support of the NNRA 
and Grant Reynolds. Rockefeller aide George Hinman, who scheduled numerous personal 
meetings and telephone conversations with Reynolds, frequently reminded others in the 
governor’s administration that in addition to his duties with the NNRA, Reynolds was the 
chairman of the Council of Republican Organizations, vice chairman of Republicans for 
Progress, and chairman of the Westchester Chapter of the NAACP (National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People).  “These positions,” Hinman argued, “give him an important 
public platform, and I continue to think we should keep him on our side.”12 
In 1967, Rockefeller personally funded the annual meeting of the New York NNRA 
chapter in Albany.
13
 The annual meeting, which was attended by forty delegates from chapters in 
Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Albany, Westchester, and New York City, issued a public position 
statement called the “Albany Declaration” that endorsed progressive Republicanism and pledged 
“to resist with our every resource all efforts to besmirch or pervert these ideals.” The statement 
continued, forming a direct attack on the growing encroachment of the right-wing activism 
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within the party, declaring that “We regard as a major threat the forces of reaction emboldened 
by the widespread unmasking of latent bigotry, so blithely and unashamedly called the ‘white 
backlash.’” They did however, recommit to their belief that the Republican Party was the best 
vehicle for advancing the causes of African Americans. “Blind allegiance” and monolithic 
support for the Democratic Party would be “self-defeating at best,” because it would not only 
give a green light for the conservative takeover of the Republican Party, but it would allow the 
Democratic Party to simply take their vote for granted.
14
 
Despite its overall critical tone towards the direction and goals of the national Republican 
Party, the Albany Declaration also provided its endorsement of the politician they believed could 
reshape the image and direction of the GOP. As the declaration concluded, the delegates 
confirmed that “we fully support and endorse the Governor of the State of New York.”15  
Throughout the mid-to-late 1960s, NAR’s support of the NNRA proved beneficial to both his 
political career and the financial stability of the organization. Following the 1967 meeting, 
Reynolds assured NAR that “the delegates who met in Albany were young, energetic, unusually 
intelligent and deeply committed to the principles of Rockefeller Republicanism.” Moreover, he 
suggested that the NNRA was an “effective instrument, both for our State and in the coming 
presidential campaign.”16 
Reminiscent of 1964, Rockefeller’s 1968 bid for the Republican presidential nomination 
again juxtaposed his civil rights record to his more conservative opponent, Richard Nixon. 
Throughout the spring of 1968, NAR continually challenged Nixon’s ambivalent comments 
towards the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and his latent appeals to white Southerners.
17
 He was 
particularly critical of Nixon’s “law and order rhetoric,” which “tends to misrepresent the black 
dissenter as a criminal who must be suppressed rather than a frustrated member of society whose 
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reactions are a result of economic, political and social representation.”18 Despite Rockefeller’s 
attacks on Nixon from the left, the national Republican Party base was a more conservative, and 
increasingly Southern demographic that could not sustain widespread support for northeastern 
progressives like NAR, Jackie Robinson, and Grant Reynolds. 
In many ways, the fate of NAR as a presidential candidate reflects the fate of black 
Republicans within the GOP during the civil rights era. Throughout the 1960s, both NAR and 
black Republicans were among the nation’s most adamant supporters for civil rights and 
social/political equality. They were also a minority voice – but a voice nonetheless – protesting 
the emerging conservatism of the Republican Party. While their ultimate goal of creating a 
progressive Republican Party did not come to fruition, they were an active part of the public 
fight for leadership within the Grand Old Party. Moreover, black Republicans of the 1960s bore 
little resemblance to the small band of black conservatives that would emerge during the Age of 
Reagan in the 1980s. Black Republicans of the early and mid-1960s were distinctly liberal in 
their outlook, active supporters of the civil rights movement, and were well within the 
mainstream of black political thought. 
The papers housed at the RAC, particularly those that provide unique insights into Grant 
Reynolds, offer an exceptional perspective unavailable at other archives in the country. Though a 
handful of Reynolds’ papers can be found at other archives, the collection housed at the RAC 
contains perhaps the single largest collection of his letters, memos, and research reports of any 
repository in the U.S. The hundreds of pages of documents relating to Reynolds are an untapped, 
yet vitally important source for any scholar seeking to better understand African American 
politics in New York, NAR’s relationship with black voters, and the complexity of black 
political networking during the civil rights era. 
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